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People choose differently when facing potential gains than when facing potential losses.
Clear gross differences in decision making between gains and losses have been
empirically demonstrated in numerous studies (e.g., framing effect, risk preference, loss
aversion). However, theories maintain that there are strong underlying connections (e.g.,
reflection effect). We investigated the relationship between gains and losses decision
making, examining risk preferences, and choice strategies (the reliance on option
information) using a monetary gamble task with interleaved trials. For risk preferences,
participants were on average risk averse in the gains domain and risk neutral/seeking
in the losses domain. We specifically tested for a theoretically hypothesized correlation
between individual risk preferences across the gains and losses domains (the reflection
effect), but found no significant relationship in the predicted direction. Interestingly,
despite the lack of reflected risk preferences, cross-domain risk preferences were
still informative of individual choice behavior. For choice strategies, in both domains
participants relied more heavily on the maximizing strategy than the satisficing strategy,
with increased reliance on the maximizing strategy in the losses domain. Additionally,
while there is no mathematical reliance between the risk preference and strategy metrics,
within both domains there were significant relationships between risk preferences and
strategies—the more participants relied upon the maximizing strategy the more risk
neutral they were (equating value and utility maximization). These results demonstrate
the complexity of gains and losses decisionmaking, indicating the apparent contradiction
that their underlying cognitive/neural processes are both dissociable and overlapping.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of decision making is to select the best possible outcome. Broadly, decision making
can be divided into two overlapping types—those with potential gains and those with potential
losses. While mathematically the sign makes little difference, there is abundant behavioral evidence
that quite different cognitive processes may be engaged when outcomes pertain to possible gains vs.
possible losses. As a powerful example, simply altering the wording of the same absolute outcome
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between a relative gain and a relative loss produces stark
differences in choices, a phenomenon called the framing effect
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981).
While it is clear that decision making is different between
gains and losses, it is unclear what specifically is altered. For
example, these differences could be due to alterations in risk
preferences or alterations in the information that participants
rely upon to make their decisions (their choice strategy).
When faced with probabilistic outcomes (uncertainty),
individuals, on average, show differential preferences when
choosing between possible gains and possible losses. In prospect
theory, individuals are considered on average risk averse for
gains (prefer smaller certain rewards to larger uncertain rewards)
and risk seeking for losses (prefer a larger possible loss over a
smaller certain loss; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This pattern
of inverted preferences over the gains and losses domains is
called the reflection effect, and has been suggested to derive from
risk preferences arising from each individual having a common
degree of diminishing weight of marginal utility across both gains
and losses. This single value (the power function risk preference
value) would result in differential behavior across gains and
losses, as individuals are drawn toward higher gains and away
from higher losses.
It is unclear whether the reflection effect actually occurs within
individuals, or is only present when comparing group averages. If
present in an individual, then there should be a fixed relationship
between risk preferences for gains and risk preferences for
losses (negatively correlated, e.g., individuals who are most risk
averse for gains should be most risk seeking for losses) and
an individual’s risk preferences from one domain should be
predictive of their risk preference in the other. When empirically
tested, the reflection effect has been found in individuals when
using hypothetical payoffs (Laury and Holt, 2000), but not with
real cash payouts (Cohen et al., 1987; Schoemaker, 1990; Laury
and Holt, 2000; Tymula et al., 2013; Kurnianingsih et al., 2015;
Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015a,b). It has recently been suggested
that the theoretical reflection effect of risk preferences across
the gains and losses domains may be the product of studying
aggregate behavior and does not exist at the level of individual
behavior (Tymula et al., 2013).
The changes in choice behavior between the gains and losses
domains may also be due to changes in the strategies individuals
employ (what information they use to make their decision).
For example, individuals can either attempt to maximize
their expected outcomes by fully engaging with the available
information, or they may satisfice to reduce the expended effort
while sacrificing expected outcomes. The differences in how
individuals utilize available information may be influenced by
sensitivity toward gains and losses. Loss aversion is a key example
of this, in which individuals tend to weight choices more heavily
on possible losses (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), and has been
suggested to increase motivation in choice behavior (McCusker
and Carnevale, 1995), which can be expressed in the use of amore
effortful strategy (requiring more calculation) as they attempt to
maximize the expected outcome. Alternatively, Schneider (1992),
using hypothetical non-incentivized scenarios, suggested that
choices were less consistent when described in a loss frame.
Differential processing of gains and losses is also supported
by biological evidence indicating that the underlying neural
computations may be separable (for review, see Levin et al.,
2012). As examples, (1) amygdala lesions result in impaired
decisions for gains but not losses (Weller et al., 2007), (2)
numerous brain regions involved in decision making show
differential responses to gains and losses—including the orbital
frontal cortex, midbrain, ventral striatum, and hippocampus
(Elliott et al., 2000; Luking and Barch, 2013), (3) aging results
in asymmetric alterations of gains and losses risk preferences
(Mikels and Reed, 2009; Weller et al., 2011; Kurnianingsih et al.,
2015), (4) sleep deprivation modulates risky decision making
strategies for gains, but not for losses (Mullette-Gillman et al.,
2015b), and (5) affect manipulations differentially modulate
choices across the gains and losses domains (Isen et al., 1988). In
contrast, there is also significant evidence of commonalities in the
neural regions engaged during gains and losses decision making
(for summary see Pessiglione and Delgado, 2015). Interestingly,
while multiple studies have suggested that gains and losses value
signals may be encoded in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC; Tom et al., 2007; Levy and Glimcher, 2012), a recent
meta-analysis of over 200 studies found evidence that the vmPFC
may only encode gains (Bartra et al., 2013).
Although such ample evidence shows clear differences
between choice behaviors and neural responses in the gains
and losses domains, it remains unclear what cognitive
processes/neural mechanisms actually drives these differences.
To investigate this, we used a monetary gamble task to examine
the interrelationships of risk preferences and choice strategies
across the gains and losses domains. Critically, we used mirrored
and intermixed gains and losses trials, to avoid any potential
order or block effects. Our hypotheses were: (1) on average,
individuals would be risk averse in the gains domain and risk
seeking in the losses domain, (2) individual risk preferences
would be uncorrelated across the gains and losses domains, (3)
individuals would show higher use of the more effortful and
maximizing strategy in the losses domain than in the gains
domain. In addition, we examined the predictive power of
cross-domain risk preferences on choice behavior and also the
interrelationship between risk preferences and choice strategies
within and across the gains and losses domains.
METHODS
Participants
Data was collected from 104 participants (57 females, age
mean ± SD = 23 ± 2.47 years old) that were students from
the National University of Singapore. All participants provided
written informed consent under a protocol approved by the
National University of Singapore Institutional Review Board.
Monetary Gamble Task Design
Risk preference and choice strategy measures were quantified
based on participant’s performance on a monetary gamble task.
Data collection and analyses were accomplished using MATLAB
(Mathworks, Natick, MA) with the Psychophysics Toolbox for
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trial presentation (Brainard, 1997), and R Statistical Software (R
Core Team, 2013).
The monetary gamble task consisted of 165 gains trials and
165 losses trials (Figure 1A). On each trial, participants chose
between a certain option and a gamble option. All gambles
featured a possible $0 outcome, to provide a clear and consistent
anchor point across all trials, to ensure the frame in which
participants considered the possible outcomes (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1974). Within the gains trial, there were five different
certain gain options ($3, $4, $5, $6, $7). Gain gambles were
constructed based upon three probabilities of winning [pWIN,
which are (25, 50, 75%)], and 11 different relative expected
values [rEV or EVGamble/VCertain, which are (0.25, 0.33, 0.50, 0.66,
0.80, 1.0, 1.25, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0, and 4.0)]. These probabilities and
relative expected values resulted in potential gains ranging from
$1 to $112. The losses trials were constructed using the same
method and values, save for mirroring the valence of the values
offered into negatives. The trial order was fully randomized
separately for each participant, intermixing gains and losses
domain trials.
Before performing the task, participants were informed that
the amount of their compensation for participation would
be between $5 and 25, based upon random selection and
resolution of one trial from each domain at the end of the
experiment. Participants were also informed that they would
be paid a proportion of the total monies that they collected,
but were not told what that proportion was. Final payment
was determined by paying out 50% for the gains task and 25%
for the losses task, with the differential to help ensure positive
compensation to the participants. On average, participants
received $7.77 (SD = $4.22; min = $5.00 and max =
$25.00).
Critically, our design features multiple safeguards to prevent
potential order, learning, or framing confounds. To prevent
order and/or block effects, gains and losses trials were randomly
intermixed. To prevent alterations of preferences and/or
strategies due to inter-trial learning, no gambles were resolved
until the completion of the experiment. To prevent framing
confounds, all gambles feature a $0 outcome to provide a clear
common anchor across trials.
Quantifying Risk Preferences
Risk preferences are commonly quantified using a variety
of methodologies. In economics, risk preference is often
conceptualized as the curvature of the value to utility function
(a power function) due to diminishing marginal utility, based
upon expected utility theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944), and prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). Risk
preference has also been quantified as the degree of variance
of the expected value (Markowitz, 1952; Bossaerts and Plott,
2004) measured using the coefficient of variation (CV), which is
calculated as the ratio of the standard deviation to the expected
value of the gamble (Weber et al., 2004).
In psychology, risk-taking behavior has been examined using
a large range of tasks and models, including the Iowa Gambling
Task (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994), the Balloon Analogue Risk Task
(BART; Lejuez et al., 2002), and the Cambridge Gamble Task
FIGURE 1 | (A) Example task trials. In each trial, participants chose between a
certain and a risky option. There were two types of trials, the gains and losses
trials, randomly intermixed. (B) Example individual choice functions for six
individuals (top: 3 for gains, bottom: 3 for losses). Choice functions were plotted
within each domain for each participant. Each relative expected value (x-axis)
was plotted against the percentage of trials (out of 15 for each point) at which
the participant selected the risky option (y-axis). (C) An illustration describing
the relationship between the relative expected value of the gamble (x-axis), the
subjective value of the gamble (y-axis) and risk premium (slope of the lines).
(CGT; Rogers et al., 1999). In such tasks, risk preference is often
quantified by the proportion of times the participant chooses the
riskier option.
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As a midpoint, in this study we used a model free
psychometric approach to empirically examine risk preferences
(Stanton et al., 2011; Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-Gillman
et al., 2015a,b). This method quantifies risk preference (in
each domain) as a risk premium metric, which measures the
degree to which people appear to alter the subjective value of
gambles due to outcome uncertainty. In addition, to facilitate
comparison with studies from economics and test the robustness
of our analyses/results, we replicated analyses utilizing the power
function metric.
Risk Premium Metric
To quantify this psychometric measure of risk, choice functions
were constructed by plotting a continuous function based upon
the percentage of gamble selection (y-axis) for each respective
examined rEV (EVGamble/VCertain; Figure 1B). This identifies the
point along the rEV axis at which the participant is indifferent
between the certain and gamble options (Stanton et al., 2011;
Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-Gillman et al., 2015a,b). This
indifference point is then converted to a risk premium value. In
the gains domain, the risk premium is generated by subtracting
1 from the indifference point value (risk premium= indifference
point − 1). In the losses domain, as the rEVs are relative to the
absolute values, the risk premium is obtained by first inverting
the indifference point value before subtracting 1 (risk premium=
1/indifference point− 1).
The risk premium value measures the degree and direction in
which an individual modulates the subjective value of a gamble
due to the outcome being unknown (Figure 1C). For example, a
risk premium value of 1 indicates that the individual requires a
gamble to have an expected value twice that of a certain option
in order to find the two options equivalent. In other words, they
are subjectively halving the expected utility of the gamble due to
uncertainty. For both domains, a zero risk premium value reflects
no change in valuation (risk neutral), a positive risk premium
value denotes diminished valuation (risk averse), and a negative
risk premium value denotes enhanced valuation (risk seeking).
We note that participants presented highly monotonic choice
functions, as exemplified by the six presented in Figure 1B. A
small number of participants had choice functions that did not
cross the 50% uncertain choice, preventing us from calculating
their indifference point (gains N = 13, losses N = 5). Such
participants were excluded from analyses of their risk premium
values. We note that the majority of such participants did not
show extreme risk preferences with monotonic choice functions,
but rather demonstrated dependence on simple heuristics (such
as always choosing the certain option, or always choosing certain
for one probability and gamble for others), resulting in choice
functions that were flat across our examined range of rEV values,
and placing their behavior outside of our functional definition
of risk preference. We note that such behavioral heuristics are
well-captured by our strategy analyses.
Power Function Metric
We also independently computed the power function metric of
risk preference for each domain (based on Tymula et al., 2013).
For gains (if V > 0) : SV = pWIN× Vα
For losses (if V < 0) : SV = −(1− pWIN)× (−V)α
where SV is the subjective value (utility), pWIN is the probability
of receiving the better outcome of the gamble, V is the potential
objective value offered and α is the participant’s risk preference
value. In the gains domain, α < 1 indicates risk averse preference,
α = 1 indicates risk neutral preference, and α > 1 indicates
risk seeking preference. In the losses domain, the relationship is
inverted, such that, α < 1 indicates risk seeking preference, and
α > 1 indicates risk averse preference.
To estimate individual’s risk preference, we used maximum
likelihood to fit the choice data of each participant with the
probability choice function (Tymula et al., 2013):
Probability of choosing the gamble option =
1
1+ e−(SVG−SVC)
where SVc is the subjective value of the certain option and SVG is
the subjective value of the gamble option.
We have previously reported strong correlations (r > |0.6|)
between our risk premium metric and the power function metric
(Stanton et al., 2011; Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-Gillman
et al., 2015a,b), and find similar results in the current sample (see
Results).
Quantifying Choice Strategy
Choice strategy measures the influence of trial factors on the
choices of each participant, as quantified through the use of linear
regressions. Analyses were conducted separately within the gains
and losses domains, through independent linear regressions to
determine the influence of two factors on the choices of each
participant: (1) the relative expected value (rEV) of the options,
and (2) the probability of winning (pWIN) the gamble option.
The R-squared value of each factor gives us a measure of the
proportion of individual’s choice variance (across trials within
domain) accounted for by each factor. Therefore, a high R-
squared value for rEV or pWINwould indicate that choices could
be well-accounted for based on that specific trial information
(e.g., a participant that accepts all gambles with a 75% chance
of winning would have a high pWIN R-squared value, and a
participant that accepts gambles with an rEV equal or higher
than 1 would have a high rEV R-squared value), whereas a low R-
squared value would indicate that choices were more likely based
on other factors (or were made randomly). It is important to
note that based on task design, the pWIN and rEV trial values
are orthogonal to each other (the correlation between trial rEV
and trial pWIN across all trials is zero). In addition, we note that
while we chose to focus on the rEV factor, in this task this factor
is essentially isometric with the difference in expected values [for
both gains and losses domains, r(102) = 0.99, p < 0.0001] and
is uncorrelated with pWIN [gains r(102) = −0.44, p < 0.0001;
losses r(102) = −0.50, p < 0.0001].
Based upon the likely outcomes, participants were considered
to be “maximizing” when they relied highly on the rEV
information and “satisficing” when they relied highly on the
pWIN information. The utilization of the rEV information
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maximizes average outcomes but requires several layers of
cognitive calculation, while focusing on the pWIN information
allows the use of simple heuristics requiring less cognitive effort.
Measuring Individual Numerical Ability
The ability to understand and perform simple mathematical
calculations was assessed using an 8-item Numeracy Scale
developed by Weller et al. (2013). This assessment was given to
the participants after they had completed the gamble task, but
before resolution of the payments for the choices were made for
the gamble task.
Measuring Behavioral Impulsiveness
Behavioral impulsiveness was assessed using The Barratt
Impulsiveness Scale (BIS-11, Patton and Stanford, 1995).
Impulsivity has been considered as a factor influencing risk-
taking behaviors (Zaleskiewicz, 2001; Zuckerman, 2007). The
30-item BIS-11 questionnaire consists of three subscales—
cognitive, non-planning, and motor. The sum of the subscale
scores provides us with a general measure of individual
overall impulsiveness. Participants completed this survey after
completion of the gamble task, but before resolution of the
payments for the choices were made for the gamble task.
RESULTS
Response Time
As a first comparison of decision behavior between the gains and
losses domains, we compared response times between gains and
losses trials (see Table 1 for summary of the results). We found
that on average, response time were longer for trials in the losses
domain [mean of individual medians ± SD difference = 0.89 ±
0.54 s, gains= 1.90± 0.68 s, losses= 2.79± 1.00 s; t(103) = 16.58,
p < 0.0001, Cohen’s d = 1.04].
Risk Preferences
Correlations Across Risk Premium and Power Metrics
To facilitate cross-analytic approaches, we compared the model-
free risk premium metric to the model-based risk preference
parameter from the power utility function. We found very high
correlations between these two risk preference metrics in both
the gains [r(89) = −0.65, p < 0.0001] and the losses domains
[r(96) = 0.58, p < 0.0001], in concurrence with our prior studies
(Stanton et al., 2011; Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-Gillman
et al., 2015a,b). These high correlations indicate that the risk
premium and power function metrics are largely capturing the
same variance across participants. To confirm this similarity and
the robustness of our results, for each analysis we provide the
results using both the risk premium and power function metrics.
Average Risk Preference
Participants were, on average, risk averse in the gains domain
[risk premium mean ± SD = 0.44 ± 0.70; significantly different
from 0, t(90) = 6.05, p < 0.0001, d = 0.64] and risk neutral in
the losses domain [risk premium mean ± SD = 0.06 ± 0.30; not
significantly different from 0, t(98) = 1.97, p = 0.052, d = 0.20;

































FIGURE 2 | Risk premium distribution across participants in the gains
domain and losses domain. The asterisk indicates the mean value of each
distribution.
TABLE 1 | Comparing economic measures between the gains and losses domain.
Gains domain Losses domain Correlation t-test z-test
mean ± SD mean ± SD Coefficient (r) p-value t-score p-value z-score p-value
Response time (s)* 0.901 ± 0.675 2.786 ± 1.003 0.860 <0.0001 16.58 <0.0001
RISK PREFERENCE
(a) Risk Premium (91, 99)** 0.441 ± 0.695 0.059 ± 0.296 0.153 0.156 5.89 <0.0001
(b) Power Function (96, 101) 0.684 ± 0.217 0.984 ± 0.259 0.084 0.395 8.30 <0.0001
Correlation between a and b r = −0.648, p < 0.0001 r = 0.583, p < 0.0001 0.71 0.478***
CHOICE STRATEGY
(c) rEV R-squared (104, 104) 0.338 ± 0.169 0.383 ± 0.117 0.608 <0.0001 3.41 <0.0001
(d) pWIN R-squared (104, 104) 0.042 ± 0.061 0.035 ± 0.050 0.242 0.013 1.02 0.310
Correlation between c and d r = −0.443, p < 0.0001 r = −0.498, p < 0.0001 0.50 0.617
PREFERENCE × STRATEGY
(e) Premium × rEV R-squared r = −0.143, p = 0.177 r = −0.436, p < 0.0001 2.19 0.029
(f) Premium × pWIN R-squared r = 0.041, p = 0.700 r = 0.246, p = 0.014 1.42 0.156
Abbreviations: rEV, relative expected value; pWIN, probability of winning; s, seconds; SD, standard deviation.
*For response times, median is provided instead of mean.
**Numbers in parentheses indicate the number of participants (Gains, Losses).
***Given the differential relationships between the premium and power metrics across the gains and losses domains, the sign of the correlation in gains was inverted for comparison
(comparing 0.648 to 0.583).
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above pattern of results (Table 1). Individuals were on average
risk averse for gains [mean ± SD = 0.68 ± 0.22; significantly
different from 0, t(103) = 14.84, p< 0.0001, d = 1.47] and weakly
risk seeking for losses [mean ± SD = 0.95 ± 0.26; significantly
different from 0, t(103) = 2.06, p = 0.04, d = 0.20], with Cohen’s
d indicating small effect size for losses (Cohen, 1988).
Testing for Non-Parametric Relationships Between
Risk Preferences Across Domains
To begin our examination of whether the reflection effect extends
from average risk preferences to individual risk preferences, we
followed the analysis of Tymula et al. (2013) by conducting a chi-
square test to examine if there was evidence of a gross categorical
relationship between individual risk preferences for gains and
losses. This analysis groups participant based on whether they
were risk averse or risk seeking in each domain (Figure 3).
Utilizing the risk premium metric, we found no significant
relationship across risk preferences across domains [χ2(1) =
2.52, p = 0.11], with only 52.9% of the participants showing
the pattern of preferences predicted by the reflection effect,
indicating no significant relationship between risk preferences
across domains. Utilizing the power functionmetric, 61.5% of the
participants had categorical risk preferences in agreement with
the reflection effect, which produced significance when examined
using the chi-square [χ2(1) = 5.51, p = 0.019]. Combined,
these results show that the reflection effect is only weakly able
to provide categorical prediction of risk preferences.
Testing for Parametric Relationship of Risk
Preferences Across Domains
The reflection effect predicts a negative correlation between gains
and losses risk premiums and a positive correlation between
gains and losses power function (Figure 3). We found non-
significant positively-signed correlations between the gains and
losses domains, for both the risk premium [r(85) = 0.15, p =
0.16] and power function metrics [r(102) = 0.08, p = 0.39]. This
clearly indicates that the reflection effect is not detectable at the
individual level. We note that, in concurrence with the finding of
Tymula et al. (2013), we find effects in the opposite direction to
that predicted by the reflection effect for the risk premiummetric.
Modeling Risk Preferences Across Domains
To empirically identify the relationships between individual risk
preferences across the gains and losses domains, we utilized linear
regressions to identify the strength and direction of the predictive
relationship.
For the risk premiummetric, the reflection effect predicts that
the losses risk premium value of each participant can be predicted
based upon a transform of the gains risk premium value of that
participant:
Predicted losses risk premium = 1/(gains risk premium+1)−1.
This is a slightly non-linear transform, which will result in
the expected relationship between the gains risk premium and
the transformed gains risk premium being dependent upon
the distribution under examination. In the current sample, the
reflection effect predicts a correlation of −0.85. Using a linear
regression to test for the presence of this relationship, we found
a non-significant regression equation (BIntercept = −0.005, p =
0.88; BSlope = 0.055, p = 0.16) with an R-squared value of 0.023,
indicating no evidence for the presence of an individual reflection
effect using the risk premium metric.
For the risk power function metric, the reflection effect
predicts that losses risk power function values should be equal
to gains risk power function values (BSlope = 1). Using linear
regression yielded a solved equation with a significant intercept,
but a non-significant slope (BIntercept = 0.88, p < 0.0001;
BSlope = 0.10, p = 0.40) with an R-squared value of 0.007.
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FIGURE 3 | (A) Relationship of within-subject risk premium values across the gains and losses domains. The dashed red line visualizes the correlation predicted by
the theoretical reflection effect, with a slope of −1 for the risk premium metric (left) and +1 for the power function metric (right). (B) Cross-domain predictive
comparison, percentage of choice behavior correctly predicted by each risk preference, across both domains. Randomized within-domain power function values were
obtained through bootstrap analysis, randomly resampling risk preference value and participant’s choice sets independently (N = 10,000 iterations, with replacement).
The standard error measurement (SEM) value is the median SEM across iterations.
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the significance found for the intercept suggests that alterations
in risk preferences across the gains and losses domains are
due to additive effects, while the theoretical reflection effect
is multiplicative. Finally, the very low overall R-squared value
indicates the lack of a meaningful predictive relationship between
the gain and loss values.
In summary, using both the risk premium and risk power
function metrics, we find no evidence for the presence of an
individual reflection effect—gains risk preferences cannot predict
losses risk preferences.
Empirically Testing the Predictive Ability of
Cross-Domain Preferences
Without a significant within-subject relationship between risk
preferences across the gains and losses domains, an important
question is whether there is any predictive power through which
cross-domain preferences can predict individual choice behavior.
To test this, we calculated the within-subject proportion of
choices that were predicted by each domains preference for each
domains choices (2×2; gains preference predicting gains choices,
gains preference predicting losses choices, losses preference
predicting gains choices, and losses preference predicting losses
choices). The cross-domain prediction measures the proportion
of choices predicted by cross-domain preference assuming the
reflection effect was true. We chose to limit this analysis to the
power function metric, given multiple comparison concerns and
the slight non-linearity across the gains and losses domains in the
risk premium metric.
To guide interpretation, we determined two reference
values for comparison. The first reference was chance, which
definitionally is set at 50% (given the two-alternative choice
task used). The second reference value accounted for behavioral
regularities across participants engaged in this task, by examining
scrambling the relationship between individual preferences and
individual choices.
This second reference value, the randomized within-domain,
was computed (for each domain) based on overall subject
behavior in this domain, but with the specific removal of
the relationship between individual preferences and individual
choice behaviors. In other words, this reference value reflects
that there may be regularities in the choice behavior across
participants in this task, such that knowledge of any participant’s
choices may facilitate prediction of another participant’s choices
(bootstrapped chance). To accomplish this, we ran two bootstrap
analyses of 10,000 iterations (one for gains, one for losses).
In each iteration, we constructed a new sample of participants
(N = 104), with replacement, by randomly selecting a preference
value and then, independently, randomly selecting a choice set.
Doing so specifically breaks the relationship between individual
preferences and the actual choice behaviors. For each constructed
participant, we then determined the proportion of choices in
the randomly-selected choice set that could be predicted by
the randomly-selected preference value. For each iteration, we
took the mean proportion of choices correctly predicted across
that sample. The median proportion across samples (N =
10,000), is our second reference value, the randomized within-
domain—the proportion of trials that can be expected to be
predictable based on knowledge of how participants behave
(on average) in the task without specific knowledge of the
participants preference value (essentially, removing all within-
subject information). In the gains domain, the median value
was 53.94% (SD = 8.86%) and in the losses domain the median
value was 49.39% (SD = 6.03%). Comparing the two different
reference values, in the gains domain the second reference
was slightly higher than chance [t(103) = 6.45, p < 0.0001,
d = 0.63], while in the losses domain, there was no significant
difference between the two reference values [t(103) = 0.67,
p= 0.50, d = 0.07].
The purpose of this analysis was to directly test how well
individual preference values are able to predict behavior cross-
domain (see Figure 3B).Within the gains domain, an individual’s
gains risk preference could account for amedian of 86.67% (SD=
6.67%) of their choice behavior. Within losses, an individual’s
losses risk preference could account for a median of 85.76%
(SD = 5.80%) of their choice. Across domains, we see that an
individual’s risk preference for gains accounts for a median of
78.48% (SD = 14.54%) of their choice behavior in the losses
domain. Similarly, an individual’s risk preference for losses
accounts for a median of 78.18% (SD = 12.76%) of their choice
behavior in the gains domain.
Contrasting these values, we see that a participant’s within-
domain risk preferences are always better predictors of their
choices compared to their cross-domain risk preferences [see
Table 2; paired-comparison t-tests Gains: t(103) = 0.87, p <
0.0001, d = 0.96; Losses: t(103) = 7.59, p < 0.0001,
d = 0.92]. Interestingly, cross-domain risk preferences are
still able to predict participant’s choices significantly better than
the two reference values (chance and bootstrapped chance, all
one-sample t-tests t > 10.88, p < 0.0001).
Choice Strategy
To examine which information each participant used to make
their choices, we quantified the degree to which each participant
relied on the trial rEV and pWIN information, as the amount of
choice variance that could be explained by each factor (Figure 4).
In the gains domain, participants relied more on the use of rEV
information (rEV R-squared mean ± SD = 0.34 ± 0.17) than
pWIN information [pWIN R-squared mean ± SD = 0.04 ±
0.06; t(103) = 14.82, p < 0.0001, d = 2.34], with a negative
relationship between the amount of rEV and pWIN information
used [r(102) = −0.44, p < 0.0001]. A similar pattern was found in
the losses domain, with higher reliance on rEV information [rEV
R-squared mean ± SD = 0.38 ± 0.12, pWIN R-squared mean ±
SD = 0.04 ± 0.05; t(103) = 23.81, p < 0.0001, d = 3.87] and
a negative relationship between the amount of rEV and pWIN
information used [r(102) =−0.50, p < 0.0001].
Across domains, participants relied more on rEV information
in the losses domain [t(103) = 3.41, p < 0.0001, d = 0.31], while
there was no difference in the amount of pWIN information used
[t(103) = 1.02, p < 0.0001, d = 0.12]. Across domains, there
were significant correlations in the amount of rEV and pWIN
information participants used [rEV: r(102) = 0.61, p < 0.0001;
pWIN: r(102) = 0.24, p = 0.013].
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TABLE 2 | Proportion of choices correctly predicted by each domain preference and reference in each domain.
Gains domain Losses domain Across domain t-test
mean% ± SD% mean% ± SD% t-score p-value
(a) Gains preference (104)* 85.20 ± 6.67 75.02 ± 14.54 7.53 <0.0001
(b) Losses preference (104) 75.49 ± 12.76 85.19 ± 5.80 7.59 <0.0001
(c) Randomized within-domain preference** 55.60 ± 8.86 49.60 ± 6.03 >100 <0.0001
median = 53.94 median = 49.39
Within domain t-test t-score p-value t-score p-value
a and b 7.53 <0.0001 7.59 <0.0001
a and c 45.28 <0.0001 15.91 <0.0001
a and 50% chance 53.83 <0.0001
b and c 17.84 <0.0001 62.59 <0.0001
b and 50% chance 6.45 <0.0001 61.87 <0.0001
c and 50% chance 0.677 0.500
*Number in parentheses indicates the number of participants.
**The relationship between individual preference and choice behavior was removed, and new samples (each N = 104, with replacement) were reconstructed through random selection
of risk preference value and independent random selection of choice set (bootstrap analysis, with N = 10,000 iterations). The values of the bootstrap analysis stated above are the












































FIGURE 4 | Choice strategy metric showing the relationship between
the amount of trial relative expected value information and trial
probability of winning information utilized. The R-squared value quantifies
the amount of choice variances that can be independently explained by each
trial factor, relative expected value (rEV) and probability of winning (pWIN).
Relationship Between Risk Premium and
Choice Strategies
We investigated the relationship between the risk preferences
and choice strategies within the gains and losses domains
(Figures 5A,B; Table 1). We opted to limit these analyses
to the risk premium metric, due to multiple comparison
concerns, the high correlations between the premium and
power function metrics, and our prior use of the premium to
examine this issue in a study with blocked trials (Kurnianingsih
et al., 2015). Within each domain, we looked separately for
correlations between the risk premium and the two choice
strategy components, rEV R-squared and pWIN R-squared.
In the gains domain, we found no correlation between risk
premium and the amount of rEV information used [r(89) =
−0.14, p = 0.18] or the amount of pWIN information used
[r(89) = 0.04, p = 0.70]. In the losses domain, we found
significant correlations between the risk premium metric and
both the amount of rEV information used [r(97) = −0.44,
p < 0.0001] and the amount of pWIN information used
[r(97) = 0.25, p = 0.014]. Comparing these correlations
across domains, the correlation between risk premium and the
amount of rEV information used was significantly stronger in
the losses domain (z = 2.25, p = 0.025), while there was no
significant change in the strength of the correlations between risk
premium and amount of pWIN information used across domains
(z = 1.42, p = 0.16).
These results indicated that, in the losses domain participants
with lower risk premium values made greater use of rEV
information (maximizing) and relied less on pWIN information
(satisficing). Interestingly, the zero-point for the risk premium
metric reflects risk neutrality, so these results indicate that,
for losses, the more an individual relied upon the maximizing
information the more risk neutral their risk preferences were. Of
note, this relationship is not a mathematical dependency (or by-
product) of the task design or analyses (it is analytically possible
for two people to have the same risk preference value yet employ
different choice strategies).
This relationship between risk neutrality and maximizing
strategies replicates a recent study using a blocked version of
these tasks (gains trials first, then losses trials; Kurnianingsih
et al., 2015). Curiously, in that study, these effects were found
only for older adults in the losses domain, while younger adults
showed no such relationship. Potential explanations for the
current expansion of this relationship to younger adults include
sampling differences or an interaction with the interleaved gains
and losses trials.
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FIGURE 5 | Relationship between individual risk premium and the
degree to which participants relied upon the relative expected value
(rEV) information in their choices in the (A) gains and (B) losses
domains. A significant negative correlation is present for losses. Relationship
between individual deviation from neutral risk preference (absolute risk
premium accounting for the non-linearity across zero) and reliance upon the
rEV information in the (C) gains and (D) losses domains. The vertical dashed
line is drawn at risk neutrality (premium = 0), and the now-unattainable negative
region is shaded gray. Following this transform, significant negative correlations
are seen in both domains, indicating that as participants relied more heavily on
the rEV information, their risk preferences became more risk neutral.
Relationship Between Absolute Risk
Premium and Choice Strategies
We were curious about the domain-specificity of the relationship
between risk premium and strategy, present for losses, and
absent for gains. We note that there is a wider distribution
of risk preferences in the gains domain, with the majority of
people risk averse but a significant number of people who are
risk seeking. In addition, there is a non-linearity in the risk
premium metric as you cross zero. To test whether this range
of values was obscuring the same relationship as found in the
losses domain, we sought to transform the data to reflect the
distance of each participant from risk neutrality (regardless
of sign). Standardly, this would be accomplished by taking
the absolute value, however with the nonlinear relationship
across zero for risk premium, the conversion of negative risk
premium values to positive requires the formula [absolute
premium value= 1/(premium value+1)−1].We performed this
transformation for both the gains and losses domains, and re-
ran the correlations between absolute risk premium and strategy.
This resulted in significant negative correlations in both the gains
[r(89) = −0.30, p = 0.004] and losses [r(97) = −0.36, p <
0.001] domains, with no significant difference across domains
(z = 0.43, p = 0.67). The more each participant relied
upon the maximizing rEV information, the more risk neutral
their preferences were (Figures 5C,D), across both gains and
losses domains.
Relationship Between Numeracy and
Economic Measures
We examined whether risk preferences and choice strategies
were correlated with individual’s numeracy ability. We found no
significant correlations between risk premiums and numeracy
score in the gains [r(89) = 0.11, p = 0.28] or losses domains
[r(97) = −0.16, p = 0.11], concurring with Tymula et al. (2013),
but contrary to the recent findings by Schley and Peters (2014).
We also examined the relationship between numeracy and the
reliance on rEV information. We found a positive correlation
between the amount of rEV information used and numeracy
score in both the gains [r(102) = 0.27, p = 0.005] and losses
domains [r(102) = 0.23, p = 0.020], indicating that individuals
with better numeracy abilities make more use of the calculable
rEV information.
Relationship Between Impulsivity and
Economic Measures
We also examined whether risk preferences and choice strategies
were correlated with individual’s level of impulsivity. The
average BIS-11 impulsiveness score across subjects was 63.62
(SD = 8.29). There was no significant correlations between
risk premiums and impulsivity score in the gains [r(89) = 0.04,
p = 0.70] or losses domains [r(97) = −0.03, p = 0.80], agreeing
with Huettel et al. (2006). For choice strategy, we also looked
at the relationship between impulsivity and the reliance on trial
information, rEV and pWIN. There was also no significant
correlations between the amount of rEV information used and
impulsivity score in the gains [r(102) = −0.13, p = 0.18] or losses
domain [r(102) = −0.05, p = 0.60], nor were there any significant
correlations between the amount of pWIN information used and
impulsivity in the gains [r(102) = 0.14, p = 0.15] or losses
domain [r(102) = 0.05, p = 0.60]. These results indicate that
the behavioral impulsivity measured by BIS-11 is independent
from risk preference and choice strategy across both gains
and losses.
DISCUSSION
We investigated the differences between gains and losses
decision making by examining the interrelationships between
risk preferences and choice strategies across the gains and losses
domains. On average, we find that participants were risk averse
for gains and risk neutral for losses. In opposition to the
reflection effect, individual risk preferences were uncorrelated
across the gains and losses domains, though cross-domain
risk preferences were still able to predict choices better than
chance or random preference. Investigating the strategies
that individuals employ, individuals showed greater reliance
on the maximizing strategy in the losses domain than in
the gains domain. Interestingly, we identified a correlation
between risk preferences and choice strategies in the losses
domain in which the more individuals relied upon the
maximizing strategy the more risk neutral their risk preferences
were.
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Testing the Sample Reflection
Effect–Average Risk Preferences in the
Gains and Losses Domains
First, we sought to replicate the classic pattern of risk preferences
predicted by prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)—
on average risk averse for gains and risk seeking for losses. In
the gains domain, individuals were on average risk averse (based
on risk premium and power function), concurring with prospect
theory. In the losses domain, however, participants were on
average risk neutral (risk premiummetric) or weakly risk seeking
(power function metric). These findings overall concur with the
findings by Kahneman and Tversky (1979), indicating a sample-
level reflection effect. We note, that this risk neutrality/weak
risk seeking for losses still concurs with the original data that
individuals are more willing to engage in gambles to prevent
losses than to achieve gains—i.e., individuals are relatively more
risk averse for gains than for losses.
Testing the Individual Reflection Effect–are
Individual Preferences Correlated Across
Domains?
The reflection effect suggests that the individuals who are most
risk averse in gains will be the most risk seeking for losses—
is this true? No. We do not find a significant relationship in
the direction predicted by the reflection effect, using either
risk preference metric (premium or power function). Our
results indicate that risk preferences for gains, cannot predict
individual risk preferences for losses, in concurrence with prior
research (Cohen et al., 1987; Schoemaker, 1990; Laury and
Holt, 2000; Kurnianingsih et al., 2015; Mullette-Gillman et al.,
2015a,b).
Interestingly, we find a non-significant correlation in the
opposite direction of effect predicted by the reflection effect,
using the risk premium metric (Table 1), in the same direction
reported recently by Tymula et al. (2013). At the extreme, if this
trend were to hold it would suggest that the individuals who were
most risk averse for gains were not themost risk seeking for losses
(as predicted by the reflection effect), but remained the most risk
averse in losses.
The reflection effect was originally identified in the
comparison of average group risk behavior across gains
and losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). It is possible to
reconcile the presence of a sample-level reflection effect, with
our correlations that are opposite the predicted direction.
Simply, these two results suggest that, for a significant number
of individuals, the difference between gains and losses risk
preferences is a shift in preferences (an additive component,
as indicated by our regression analysis for the power function
metric). In other words, for many people, those who are most
risk averse for gains shift to become less risk averse, while those
that are least risk averse shift to become less risk averse, risk
neutral, or even risk seeking (depending on the degree of the
shift).
Alternatively, while it is common to discuss risk preference
as a unitary stable concept (such as a personality trait), there is
also evidence that risk preferences may be independent across
different domains. For example, evidence suggests independence
of risk attitudes across domains such as investment, insurance,
health, recreational, work, and social decisions (Hershey and
Schoemaker, 1980; Weber et al., 2002). Interestingly, though
we did not find any correlation between risk preferences
across domains, we found that individual’s cross-domain
risk preferences did contain information that was able to
facilitate prediction of choice behavior. Therefore, although risk
preferences may be strongly context and domain dependent, an
underlying general risk preference may moderate cross-domain
factors.
One interesting question raised by these results is how to
consider mixed gambles (those with both possible gains and
losses components). It is unclear whether gains and losses risk
preferences would be predictive of behavior over mixed-gambles.
Difference in Choice Strategies Between
the Gains and Losses Domains
We examined whether the trial information individuals rely
upon to make their choices differs across the gains and losses
domains. While both domains featured greater reliance on the
rEV information over the pWIN, there was even greater reliance
on rEV information in the losses domain than in the gains
domain. There is inherently no difference in the difficulty of
calculations across the gains and losses domains, suggesting this
result must be due to enhanced motivation in the losses domain;
that participants were more willing to engage in the effortful rEV
calculations to avoid possible losses than to reach possible gains.
This concurs with recent studies that have found that incentives
framed as losses result in higher work productivity compared to
incentives framed as gains (Fryer et al., 2012; Hossain and List,
2012).
Relationship Between Risk Preference and
Choice Strategy
In both the gains and losses domains, we found a negative
correlation between distance from risk neutrality and the degree
to which participants used the rEV information (the maximizing
strategy in our task). Importantly, this relationship is not due to
a mathematical dependency in the task or analyses, but is the
result of the behavior of the participants (in other words, in our
task/analyses it is possible for participants to have any pairing of
risk preferences with any strategy value).
Risk neutral preferences suggest the absence of value
modulation due to uncertainty—that participants were unbiased
by uncertainty. As risk neutrality is the point where utility
maximization converges with value maximization, this
relationship indicates that those people who relied more on
the use of rEV information, used the information not only to
maximize their utility but were simultaneously maximizing the
expected value of the outcomes.
In our task, the maximizing strategy requires deliberative
cognitive processing, and we find a relationship between
higher reliance on such deliberative reasoning and risk neutral
preferences. In contrast, higher reliance on automatic cognitive
processes bias preferences away from neutrality. These results
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concur with suggestions that risk may modulate decision making
away from neutrality due to inclusion of affective responses (e.g.,
anticipated fear of loss; Loewenstein et al., 2001). Such differential
influences of cognitive and affective processes is described by
dual cognitive theory, in which there is a competition between
slow-deliberative and automatic-effortless processing during the
decision making process (Kahneman and Frederick, 2002; Evans,
2003). As a result, as individuals increased reliance on the
maximizing strategy, this would have competitively reduced
inclusion of affective biases, resulting in more neutral risk
preferences.
An interesting possibility is that this relationship between
risk preferences and choice strategy may provide a potential
explanation as to why risk preferences appear to vary across
different contexts (such as financial, health, and social domains;
Weber et al., 2002). If risk preferences are driven by the choice
strategy, and if the available types or quality of information varies
across contexts, then a stable underlying risk preference could
be differentially expressed across different contexts/domains.
Similar choice strategies may reflect the same underlying
cognitive processing modulating the risk preferences used to
govern choices made. As such, varying risk preferences across
contexts may be due to necessarily differential strategies due to
domain-specific information.
Explanation for Framing Effect?
These findings offer a potential explanation for the framing effect.
Standardly, studies examining the framing effect observe a shift in
risk preferences between the presented relative gains and relative
losses, with participants more willing to accept gambles in which
they can avoid a possible loss (for review, see Kühberger, 1998;
Levin et al., 1998). We show that this shift in risk preference
is not due to the reflection effect, which would have suggested
that the same cognitive/neural processes are engaged in either
domain. Rather, we see independence between risk preferences
across the gains and losses domains, which suggests that different
cognitive/neural mechanisms are engaged when prospects are
framed as gains and losses and that an individual’s choices in
one domain cannot predict choices in the other domain. In
other words, while the relative gain option and the relative loss
option are mathematically equivalent there may be significant
differences in the cognitive/neural systems that are engaged to
process these options. If so, a simple transformation of the
available options (such as altering the values from absolute
to relative a mid-value) could result in dramatically different
decisions as different cognitive processes/neural substrates are
engaged.
CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we found multiple indicators of independence
and differentiation in gains and losses decision making. For
risk preferences, utilizing two different preference metrics, we
replicated the differentiation of average preferences for gains
and losses, with risk averse for gains and risk neutral/seeking
for losses. However, moving to individual participants, we were
unable to show the interrelationship of risk preferences predicted
by prospect theory and the reflection effect. Examining the
strategies that participants employed to make their choices,
across domains, individuals placed greater reliance on the
effortful maximizing strategy, and the more they relied on
this choice strategy the more their preferences were neutral.
However, we did not show pure independence across gains and
losses decision making. Cross-domain risk preferences still had
predictive information about choices, even though we found not
only non-significant but also opposite-signed correlations from
that predicted by prospect theory’s reflection effect.
Taken together, these findings suggest that gains and losses
decision making are the result of both separable and overlapping
cognitive/neural mechanisms. The separability is suggested
by the independence of risk preferences across domains—
even in intermixed gains and losses trials preferences across
domains were uncorrelated. The overlap is suggested by the
maintained predictive power of cross-domain risk preferences
and the cross-domain relationship between risk preferences and
strategies.
A possible explanation for such simultaneous separability
and overlap is in the encoding and interactions of the
valuative and executive processes. Although gains and losses are
trivially related mathematically, and both provide motivation
for decision making, they are the result of extremely different
evolutionary pressures and the cognitive processes/neural
mechanisms will reflect such convergence and divergence.
Separabilities in behavior will arise to the degree there is
differential/divergent neural encoding of the valuative/affective
signals for gains and losses (Bartra et al., 2013; Pessiglione
and Delgado, 2015). Overlapping behavior will arise from
engagement of shared/convergent non-valuative processes,
such as executive processes related to working memory and
contingency processing (Mullette-Gillman and Huettel, 2009;
Miller and Cohen, 2001). As these shared executive and
differential valuative processes interact (Mullette-Gillman et al.,
2011), they will result in aspects of behavior that exhibit
both convergence and divergence between the gains and losses
domains.
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